In recent months, Microsoft has seen cyberattacks targeting security researchers by an actor we track as ZINC. The campaign originally came back our attention after Microsoft Defender for Endpoint saw an attack in progress. Observed targeting includes pen testers, private offensive security researchers, and employees at security and tech corporations. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center( MSTIC) attributes this campaign with high confidence to ZINC, a DPRK-affiliated and state-sponsored group, based on observed tradecraft, infrastructure, malware patterns, and report affiliations.
This ongoing campaign was reported by Google’s Threat Analysis Group( TAG) earlier the coming week, capturing the browser-facing impact of this attack. By sharing additional details of the attack, we hope to raise awareness in the cybersecurity community about additional techniques used in this campaign and serve as a reminder to security professionals that they are high-value targets for attackers.
We also want to thank our industry colleagues at Twitter and GitHub for their collaboration in this investigation and rapid actions to suspend the malicious reports targeting the security community and our reciprocal customers.
We are sharing this information with the community as one of the purposes of our mission to shine a light on bad actors and elevate awareness of low-profile tactics and techniques that easily fly under the radar of security operations centres( SOCs) or security professionals and are easily overlooked as low-level alerts or benign chattering. The related IoCs and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint product detections we share in this blog will help SOCs proactively hunt for referred activity in their environments and elevate any low-level alerts for remediation. ZINC used a variety of new techniques to target the victims, including win credibility on social media with genuine content, mailing malicious Visual Studio projects, and using a watering hole website weaponized with browser exploits.
In mid-2 020, ZINC started building a reputation in the safety research community on Twitter by retweeting high quality security content and posting about exploit research from an actor-controlled blog. Throughout the lifetime of information campaigns, the actor operated several reports that accounted for roughly 2,000 followers, including many prominent security researchers.
In the image below, one of the actor-controlled Twitter account retweets another of their reports to amplify their own posts. The posts from the actors received a reasonable sum of attention, typically accumulating several hundred likes or retweets.
Figure 1. Actor-controlled Twitter handles
After building their reputation across their established social media accounts, the actors started approaching potential targets on social media platforms such as Twitter and LinkedIn. The dialogues were frequently apparently innocuous, asking security questions or talking about exploit techniques. If the researcher was responsive, the actor would offer to move communication to another platform( e.g ., email, Discord) in some cases to then send files applying encrypted or PGP protected ZIPs.
ZINC likewise use their Twitter accounts to post links to a security blog they owned( br0vvnn [.] io ). These relates were also shared by many others in the security community on Twitter and other social media platforms, further deepening trust for the owner and content.
A blog post titled DOS2RCE: A New Technique To Exploit V8 NULL Pointer Dereference Bug, was shared by the actor on October 14, 2020 from Twitter. Starting in october 19 -2 1, 2020, some researchers, who hadn’t been contacted or sent any files by ZINC profiles, clicked the links while applying the Chrome browser, resulting in known ZINC malware on their machines soon after. This suggests that a Chrome browser exploit chain was likely hosted on the blog, although we haven’t been able to prove this. Since some of the victim’s browsers have been completely patched, it’s also suspected, but unproven, that the exploit chain used 0-day or patch gap exploits. We believe that not all visitors to the site were compromised, even during the course of its dates listed above.
Malicious Visual Studio programme
Some of the files sent by ZINC to researchers were malicious Visual Studio projects that included prebuilt binaries. One of the binaries used the well-known name Browse.vc.db but was a malicious DLL rather than a database file. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sees these DLLs as Comebacker malware. A pre-build event with a PowerShell command was used to launch Comebacker via rundll3 2. This use of a malicious pre-build event is an innovative technique to gain execution.
An example of the PowerShell in the pre-build event can be seen here 😛 TAGEND
Pre-build events are stored in the. vcxproj file in Visual Studio solutions. The page How to: Use Build Events in MSBuild Project has a list of other construct events and instance XML for the events. It would also be possible to abuse a custom construct step in the same way.
Analyzing Comebacker DLLs
Once the malicious Visual Studio Project file was built, the process drops C :\ ProgramData \ VirtualBox \ update.bin and adds the file to an autostart registry key. Update.bin( SH-A2 56: 25 d8 ae46 …) is a different 64 -bit DLL file embedded inside Browser.VC.db.
The actors threw some endeavour into modifying the Comebacker malware attributes between deployments; file names, file paths and exported parts were regularly varied so these static IOCs can’t be solely relied upon for dependable detecting. We were first alerted to the attack when Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detected the Comebacker DLL attempting to perform process privilege escalation. See the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detectings part for a full process chain of the attack.
Klackring is a DLL that registers a malicious service on the targeted machine. It was deployed to victims either by the Comebacker malware or an unknown dropper. The DLL was fallen to C :\ Windows \ system3 2 and saved with the. sys file extension.
In one instance, we discovered the actor had downloaded an age-old version of the Viraglt6 4. sys driver from the Vir.IT eXplorer antivirus. The file was dropped to the victim system as C :\ Windows \ System3 2 \ motorists \ circlassio.sys. The actor then attempted to exploit CVE-2 017 -1 6238, described by the finder here, where the driver doesn’t perform adequate checking on a buffer it receives, which can be abused to gain an arbitrary kernel write primitive. The actor’s code however appears to be buggy and when attempting to exploit the vulnerability the exploit tried to overwrite some of the driver’s own code which crashed the victim’s machine.
Other tools used included an encrypted Chrome password-stealer hosted on ZINC domain https :// codevexillium [.] org. The host DLL( SH-A2 56: ada7e 80 c …) was downloaded to the route C :\ ProgramData \ USOShared \ USOShared.bin using PowerShell and then ran via rundll3 2. This malware is a weaponized version of CryptLib, and it decrypted the Chrome password stealer( SH-A2 56: 9fd0506 …), which it dropped to C :\ ProgramData \ USOShared \ USOShared.dat.
After establishing a command-and-control( C2) channel on a targeted machine, the backdoor is configured to check into the C2 servers every 60 seconds. Over this C2 channel, security threats performers can execute remote commands to itemize files/ directories and running process, and to collect/ upload information about the target device, including IP address, Computer Name, and NetBIOS. Furthermore, we find some hands-on-keyboard action to enumerate all files/ directories on the target disk, make screenshots, and deploy additional modules.
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detections
When malware is run from a malicious Visual Studio project, the following alerts and process tree are generated by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. Multiple alerts, including “Use of living-off-land binary to run malware” and “Process Privilege escalation”, were triggered on the execution of Browser.VC.db and update.bin.
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint has comprehensive detection coverage for this campaign. These detectings elevate alertings that inform security procedures teams about the presence of activities and artifact from the attacks. Security operations and incident response teams can use investigation and remediation tools in Microsoft Defender Endpoint to perform deep investigation and additional hunting.
Figure 2. Alert brought about by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint on ComeBacker
Figure 3. Alert raised by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint on low-reputation arbitrary code executed by signed executable
Recommended acts and preventative measures
If you visited the referenced ZINC-owned blog( br0vvnn [.] io ), you should immediately run a full antimalware scan and use the IOCs to check your systems for intrusion. If a scan or searching for the IOCs find any related malware on your systems, you should assume full compromise and rebuild. Microsoft assesses that security research was the likely objective of the attack, and any informed of the affected machine may be compromised.
For proactive prevention of this type of attack, it is recommended that security professionals use an isolated environment( e.g ., a virtual machine) for build untrusted programmes in Visual Studio or opening any relates or files is sending out unknown parties.
Related indicators of compromise( IOCs)
The below listing furnishes IOCs observed during this activity. We foster our customers to implement detections and protections to identify possible prior campaigns or prevent future campaigns against their systems.
Azure Sentinel customers can find a Sentinel query containing these indicators in this GitHub repo: https :// github.com/ Azure/ Azure-Sentinel/ tree/ lord/ Detections/ MultipleDataSources/ ZincJan2 72021 IOCs.yaml
Microsoft 365 Defender customers can find referred hunting queries below or at this GitHub repo: https :// github.com/ microsoft/ Microsoft-3 65 -Defender-Hunting-Queries /
Backdoor: Script/ ComebackerCompile.A! dha Trojan: Win6 4/ Comebacker.A! dha Trojan: Win6 4/ Comebacker.A.gen! dha Trojan: Win6 4/ Comebacker.B.gen! dha Trojan: Win3 2/ Comebacker.C.gen! dha Trojan: Win3 2/ Klackring.A! dha Trojan: Win3 2/ Klackring.B! dha
Actor-controlled Twitter Handles
https :// twitter.com/ z055g https://twitter.com/james0x40 https :// twitter.com/ mvp4p 3r https://twitter.com/dev0exp https :// twitter.com/ BrownSec3Labs https://twitter.com/br0vvnn https :// twitter.com/ 0xDaria
Actor-controlled LinkedIn profiles
https :// www.linkedin.com/ in/ james-williamson-5 5a9b81a6/ https://www.linkedin.com/in/guo-zhang-b152721bb/ https :// www.linkedin.com/ in/ linshuang-li-aa6 9391 bb/
Actor-controlled GitHub Accounts
Further investigation revealed a number of GitHub reports with epithets matching the Twitter manages published by Google 😛 TAGEND
https :// github.com/ br0vvnn https://github.com/dev0exp https :// github.com/ henya2 90 https://github.com/james0x40 https :// github.com/ tjrim9 1
Actor-controlled blog URLs
https :// br0vvnn [.] io https://blog.br0vvnn[.]io Actor-controlled C2 domains
codevexillium [.] org angeldonationblog[.]com investbooking [.] de krakenfolio[.]com Likely legitimate but compromised websites used as C2
www.dronerc [.] it www.edujikim[.]com www.fabioluciani [.] com trophylab[.]com forums.joycity [.] com Marcodetech[.]net Linelcssplugin [.] org
https :// codevexillium [.] org/ image/ download/ download.asp https://angeldonationblog[.]com/image/upload/upload.php https :// www.dronerc [.] it/ shop_testbr/ Core/ upload.php https://www.dronerc[.]it/forum/uploads/index.php https :// www.dronerc [.] it/ shop_testbr/ upload/ upload.php https://www.edujikim[.]com/intro/blue/insert.asp https :// investbooking [.] de/ upload/ upload.asp
0ac5c8ad0c2ddef4d41724acac586ffabcc92ab9d4906a4fc4a1ff2ec2feec7c 1cc60cb1e08779ff140dfbb4358a7c2587ba58ad2f1f23343b9efb51bb25aaed 5024 f199836692fe428aef3d41a561448632e9cbab954f842ef300573600423d 98a6e0c8b8ec4dbbc3ef21308ec04912fa38e84828cedad99e081d588811ba5e d02752aadc71fafa950a6a51b1298dc914e81d20f95a86b12ee07cd2d2a85711
0acf21fba2b46ad2dd9c0da887f0fda704e7a5569b735c288d43a57688eb53fa 133280e985448a3cfa8906830af137634c4657740a8c7209a368c5a0d0b3dabf 25 d8 ae4678c37251e7ffbaeddc252ae2530ef23f66e4c856d98ef60f399fa3dc 284df008aa2459fd1e69b1b1c54fb64c534fce86d2704c4d4cc95d72e8c11d6f 34 e13e2efb336fbe8202ca931a496aa451cf554450806b63d25a57a627e0fb65 39ad9ae3780c2f6d41b1897e78f2b2b6d549365f5f024bc68d1fe794b940f9f1 4c3499f3cc4a4fdc7e67417e055891c78540282dccc57e37a01167dfe351b244 68e6b9d71c727545095ea6376940027b61734af5c710b2985a628131e47c6af7 80 a19caf4cfc9717d449975f98a157d0a483bf48a05e3b6f7a9b204faa8c35d1 88aeaff0d989db824d6e9429cd94bc22bbbfc39775c0929e703343798f69e9cc 9138714329 89378 a042f5023351c2fa2c2f43b497b75ef2a5fd16d65aa7d0f54 ca48fa63bd603c74ab02841fc6b6e90c29a9b740232628fadafa923d2833a314 d0678fe8c92912698c4b9d4d03d83131e16d8b219ccf373fa847da476788785b 5815103140c68614fd7fc05bad540e654a37b81b7e451e213128f2eff081005a e413e8094d76061f094f8b9339d00d80514065f7d37c184543c0f80c5d51bd80 c23f50c8014c190afa14b4c2c9b85512fb3a75405652c9b6be1401f678295f36 a75886b016d84c3eaacaf01a3c61e04953a7a3adf38acf77a4a2e3a8f544f855
0acf21fba2b46ad2dd9c0da887f0fda704e7a5569b735c288d43a57688eb53fa 16ad21aedf8f43fcedaa19dbd4f4fda0f3fec0517662b99a3054dac6542ab865 1d9a58bc9b6b22fb3e3099996dbab13bfc5258b8307026f66fa69729d40f2b13 4bfeb22ec438cf7ed8a7fefe6e7f321d842ad6ade0ca772732d1a757177e7ad7 6b3a693d391426182fc2944d14b0816cdf1e5f87c13d6eb697756f9577b0bcee 70e1f774c0c80e988641d709d3a6990193e039b1ce618ceaacc1d61a850e9b76 77 a9a0f67d09cafaf05ee090483a64622a7a04dfe226763f68651b071c1802f2 8d85e31de2623538a42a211e3919d5602f99dc80f21e0c5f99d53838b2b07063 90 b4bd609b84c41beeed5b9310f2d84de83c74aaecfd1facc02e278be5059110 9c90bbe4b61136d94170e90c299adab0d1ccbc3a8f71519799dd901d742f3561 9f23069f74d0fb09823ad7f46f338d7920a731622404a7754df36ffbc40f8744 a1c4c617d99d10bbb2524b4d5bfdcf00f47d9cf39e8c7d3e6a9ce1219393da5a a4fb20b15efd72f983f0fb3325c0352d8a266a69bb5f6ca2eba0556c3e00bd15 aa5264323755a7dfa7c39ada09224c8c1de03ec8aeb6f7b216a56e8475e5f547 aeb6fb 0ba6d947b4ee67a5111fbdf798c4488377ae28bdf537c1f920a58785b7 b47969e73931546fdcfb1e69c43da911dc9f7bb8d0e211731a253b572ecdc4fe bc19a9415428973d65358291d604d96a0915a01d4b06939269b9e210f23aad43 c5d13324100047d7def82eeafdb6fc98cc2ccfae56db66ada9f1c3c7429ef9cb dcc9 86 c48c9c99c012ae2b314ac3f2223e217aee2ccdfb733cbbdaea0b713589 e8cf9b04ba7054e1c34bda05106478f9071f8f6569b4822070834abbf8e07a95 b32319da446dcf83378ab714f5ad0229dff43c9c6b345b69f1a397c951c1122e 11fef660dec27474c0c6c856a7b4619155821fdd1ce404848513a2700be806a5 9e562cc5c3eb48a5f1a1ccd29bf4b2ff4ab946f45aa5d8ea170f69104b684023
viaglt6 4. sys- Vulnerable Vir.IT driver for CVE-2 017 -1 6238
Other malware and tools
e0e59bfc22876c170af65dcbf19f744ae560cc43b720b23b9d248f4505c02f3e 3d3195697521973efe0097a320cbce0f0f98d29d50e044f4505e1fbc043e8cf9 0a2d81164d524be7022ba8fd4e1e8e01bfd65407148569d172e2171b5cd76cd4 96d7a93f6691303d39a9cc270b8814151dfec5683e12094537fd580afdf2e5fe dc4cf164635db06b2a0b62d313dbd186350bca6fc88438617411a68df13ec83c 46efd5179e43c9cbf07dcec22ce0d5527e2402655aee3afc016e5c260650284a 95 e42a94d4df1e7e472998f43b9879eb34aaa93f3705d7d3ef9e3b97349d7008 9d5320e883264a80ea214077f44b1d4b22155446ad5083f4b27d2ab5bd127ef5 9fd05063ad203581a126232ac68027ca731290d17bd43b5d3311e8153c893fe3 ada7e80c9d09f3efb39b729af238fcdf375383caaf0e9e0aed303931dc73b720 edb1 597789 c7ed784b85367a36440bf05267ac786efe5a4044ec23e490864cee 33665ce1157ddb7cd7e905e3356b39245dfba17b7a658bdbf02b6968656b9998 3ab770458577eb72bd6239fe97c35e7eb8816bce5a4b47da7bd0382622854f7c b630ad8ffa11003693ce8431d2f1c6b8b126cd32b657a4bfa9c0dbe70b007d6c 53 f3e55c1217dafb8801af7087e7d68b605e2b6dde6368fceea14496c8a9f3e5 99c95b5272c5b11093eed3ef2272e304b7a9311a22ff78caeb91632211fcb777 f21abadef52b4dbd01ad330efb28ef50f8205f57916a26daf5de02249c0f24ef 2cbdea62e26d06080d114bbd922d6368807d7c6b950b1421d0aa030eca7e85da 079659 fac6bd 9a1ce28384e7e3a465be4380acade3b4a4a4f0e67fd0260e9447 0b9133bc24593a358c0471da4aa9c7479270dab93c0941e5132af6ba177c5228 Host IOCs
Comebacker Visual Studio Project file execution
Rundll3 2. exe dxgkrnl_poc.vcxproj.suo, CMS_dataFinal Bx9yb 37 GEcJNK6bt 4231
Comebacker file names and exported role name
Note that the file name was often modified and these names shouldn’t be considered a definitive list 😛 TAGEND
Browse.vc.db, ENGINE_get_RAND NVIDIA.bin,SSL_HandShaking adobe.bin, SSL_HandShaking USOShared.bin,ntWindowsProc update.dat, SetWebFilterString update.bin,CleanupBrokerString ntuser.db, glInitSampler RdrCEF.bin,json_object_get_unicode_string update.bin, ASN2_TYPE_new USO.DAT,deflateSuffix USO.DAT, cmsSetLogHandlerTHR USO.DAT,sql_blob_open localdb.db, ntSystemInfo
C :\ Windows \ System3 2 \ helpsvc.sys C:\Windows\System32\Irmon.sys C :\ Windows \ System3 2 \ LogonHours.sys C:\Windows\System32\Ntmssvc.sys C :\ Windows \ System3 2 \ NWCWorkstation.sys C:\Windows\System32\Nwsapagent.sys C :\ Windows \ System3 2 \ PCAudit.sys C:\Windows\System32\uploadmgr.sys
Look for. bin,. db,. dat, and. cpl files in the following folders, USOShared was most used across victims 😛 TAGEND
C :\ ProgramData \ USOShared \ C:\ProgramData\Adobe\ C :\ ProgramData \ Mozilla \ C:\ProgramData\NVIDIA\ C :\ ProgramData \ Oracle \ C:\ProgramData\VirtualBox\
C :\ MSCache \ msomui.dat C:\MSCache\local.cpl C :\ ProgramData \ ntuser.db C:\ProgramData\ntuser.ini C :\ ProgramData \ taskhost.exe C:\ProgramData\Adobe\get.exe C :\ ProgramData \ Adobe \ ARM \ AdobeUpdate.exe C:\ProgramData\Mozilla\update.bin C :\ ProgramData \ NVIDIA \ graphicscheck.exe C:\ProgramData\NVIDIA\NVIDIA.bin C :\ ProgramData \ Oracle \ java.db C:\ProgramData\Oracle\java.cpl C :\ ProgramData \ USOShared \ Search.bin C:\Windows\netsvc.exe C :\ Windows \ system3 2 \ kjchost.dll C:\Windows\System32\traextapi.dll C :\ Windows \ System3 2 \ healthextapi.dll C:\Windows\System32\detaextapi.dll C :\ Windows \ Temp \ ads.tmp C:\windows\Temp\CA_Root.pfx C :\ Recovery \ recover.bin C:\Recovery\re.bin Advanced hunting queries
Command and control
DeviceNetworkEvents | where RemoteUrl in ~( ‘codevexillium.org’, ‘angeldonationblog.com’, ‘investbooking.de’, ‘krakenfolio.com’)
Look for PowerShell launched from MSBUILD with the related commands. Run Query in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
DeviceProcessEvents | where FileName =~ “powershell.exe” | where ProcessCommandLine has “is6 4bitoperatingsystem” and ProcessCommandLine has “Debug \\ Browse”
DeviceFileEvents | where SHA2 56 in ~( // Malicious Visual Studio. vcxproj files ‘0ac5c8ad0c2ddef4d41724acac586ffabcc92ab9d4906a4fc4a1ff2ec2feec7c’, ‘1cc 60 cb1e08779ff140dfbb4358a7c2587ba58ad2f1f23343b9efb51bb25aaed’, ‘5024f199836692fe428aef3d41a561448632e9cbab954f842ef300573600423d’, ‘9 8a6e0c8b8ec4dbbc3ef21308ec04912fa38e84828cedad99e081d588811ba5e’, ‘d02752aadc71fafa950a6a51b1298dc914e81d20f95a86b12ee07cd2d2a85711’, // Comebacker Malware ‘0acf21fba2b46ad2dd9c0da887f0fda704e7a5569b735c288d43a57688eb53fa’, ‘1 33280 e985448a3cfa8906830af137634c4657740a8c7209a368c5a0d0b3dabf’, ’25d8ae4678c37251e7ffbaeddc252ae2530ef23f66e4c856d98ef60f399fa3dc’, ‘2 84 df008aa2459fd1e69b1b1c54fb64c534fce86d2704c4d4cc95d72e8c11d6f’, ’34e13e2efb336fbe8202ca931a496aa451cf554450806b63d25a57a627e0fb65′, ‘3 9ad9ae3780c2f6d41b1897e78f2b2b6d549365f5f024bc68d1fe794b940f9f1’, ‘4c3499f3cc4a4fdc7e67417e055891c78540282dccc57e37a01167dfe351b244’, ‘6 8e6b9d71c727545095ea6376940027b61734af5c710b2985a628131e47c6af7′, ’80a19caf4cfc9717d449975f98a157d0a483bf48a05e3b6f7a9b204faa8c35d1’, ‘8 8aeaff0d989db824d6e9429cd94bc22bbbfc39775c0929e703343798f69e9cc’, ‘913871432989378a042f5023351c2fa2c2f43b497b75ef2a5fd16d65aa7d0f54’, ‘ca4 8fa63bd603c74ab02841fc6b6e90c29a9b740232628fadafa923d2833a314’, ‘d0678fe8c92912698c4b9d4d03d83131e16d8b219ccf373fa847da476788785b’, ‘5 8151031 40 c68614fd7fc05bad540e654a37b81b7e451e213128f2eff081005a’, ‘e413e8094d76061f094f8b9339d00d80514065f7d37c184543c0f80c5d51bd80’, ‘c2 3f50c8014c190afa14b4c2c9b85512fb3a75405652c9b6be1401f678295f36’, ‘a75886b016d84c3eaacaf01a3c61e04953a7a3adf38acf77a4a2e3a8f544f855’, // Klackring Malware ‘0acf21fba2b46ad2dd9c0da887f0fda704e7a5569b735c288d43a57688eb53fa’, ‘1 6ad21aedf8f43fcedaa19dbd4f4fda0f3fec0517662b99a3054dac6542ab865’, ‘1d9a58bc9b6b22fb3e3099996dbab13bfc5258b8307026f66fa69729d40f2b13’, ‘4bfeb 22 ec438cf7ed8a7fefe6e7f321d842ad6ade0ca772732d1a757177e7ad7’, ‘6b3a693d391426182fc2944d14b0816cdf1e5f87c13d6eb697756f9577b0bcee’, ‘7 0e1f774c0c80e988641d709d3a6990193e039b1ce618ceaacc1d61a850e9b76′, ’77a9a0f67d09cafaf05ee090483a64622a7a04dfe226763f68651b071c1802f2’, ‘8d 85 e31de2623538a42a211e3919d5602f99dc80f21e0c5f99d53838b2b07063′, ’90b4bd609b84c41beeed5b9310f2d84de83c74aaecfd1facc02e278be5059110’, ‘9c 90 bbe4b 61136 d94170e90c299adab0d1ccbc3a8f71519799dd901d742f3561’, ‘9f23069f74d0fb09823ad7f46f338d7920a731622404a7754df36ffbc40f8744’, ‘a1c 4c617d99d10bbb2524b4d5bfdcf00f47d9cf39e8c7d3e6a9ce1219393da5a’, ‘a4fb20b15efd72f983f0fb3325c0352d8a266a69bb5f6ca2eba0556c3e00bd15’, ‘aa5 2643237 55 a7dfa7c39ada09224c8c1de03ec8aeb6f7b216a56e8475e5f547’, ‘aeb6fb0ba6d947b4ee67a5111fbdf798c4488377ae28bdf537c1f920a58785b7’, ‘b4 7969 e73931546fdcfb1e69c43da911dc9f7bb8d0e211731a253b572ecdc4fe’, ‘bc19a9415428973d65358291d604d96a0915a01d4b06939269b9e210f23aad43’, ‘c5d 13324100047 d7def82eeafdb6fc98cc2ccfae56db66ada9f1c3c7429ef9cb’, ‘dcc986c48c9c99c012ae2b314ac3f2223e217aee2ccdfb733cbbdaea0b713589’, ‘e8cf 9b04ba7054e1c34bda05106478f9071f8f6569b4822070834abbf8e07a95’, ‘b32319da446dcf83378ab714f5ad0229dff43c9c6b345b69f1a397c951c1122e’, ‘1 1fef660dec27474c0c6c856a7b4619155821fdd1ce404848513a2700be806a5’, ‘9e562cc5c3eb48a5f1a1ccd29bf4b2ff4ab946f45aa5d8ea170f69104b684023′, // viaglt6 4. sys- Vulnerable Vir.IT driver for CVE-2 017 -1 6238 ’58a74dceb2022cd8a358b92acd1b48a5e01c524c3b0195d7033e4bd55eff4495’ // Other potentially related malware and tools ‘e0e59bfc22876c170af65dcbf19f744ae560cc43b720b23b9d248f4505c02f3e’, ‘3d 3195697521 973 efe0 097 a320cbce0f0f98d29d50e044f4505e1fbc043e8cf9’, ‘0a2d81164d524be7022ba8fd4e1e8e01bfd65407148569d172e2171b5cd76cd4’, ‘9 6d7a93f6691303d39a9cc270b8814151dfec5683e12094537fd580afdf2e5fe’, ‘dc4cf164635db06b2a0b62d313dbd186350bca6fc88438617411a68df13ec83c’, ‘4 6efd5179e43c9cbf07dcec22ce0d5527e2402655aee3afc016e5c260650284a’, ’95e42a94d4df1e7e472998f43b9879eb34aaa93f3705d7d3ef9e3b97349d7008′, ‘9d 5320 e883264a80ea214077f44b1d4b22155446ad5083f4b27d2ab5bd127ef5’, ‘9fd05063ad203581a126232ac68027ca731290d17bd43b5d3311e8153c893fe3’, ‘ada7e 80 c9d09f3efb39b729af238fcdf375383caaf0e9e0aed303931dc73b720’, ‘edb1597789c7ed784b85367a36440bf05267ac786efe5a4044ec23e490864cee’, ‘3 3665 ce1157ddb7cd7e905e3356b39245dfba17b7a658bdbf02b6968656b9998’, ‘3ab770458577eb72bd6239fe97c35e7eb8816bce5a4b47da7bd0382622854f7c’, ‘b6 30 ad8ffa11003693ce8431d2f1c6b8b126cd32b657a4bfa9c0dbe70b007d6c’, ’53f3e55c1217dafb8801af7087e7d68b605e2b6dde6368fceea14496c8a9f3e5′, ‘9 9c95b5272c5b11093eed3ef2272e304b7a9311a22ff78caeb91632211fcb777’, ‘f21abadef52b4dbd01ad330efb28ef50f8205f57916a26daf5de02249c0f24ef’, ‘2cbdea 62 e26d06080d114bbd922d6368807d7c6b950b1421d0aa030eca7e85da’, ‘079659fac6bd9a1ce28384e7e3a465be4380acade3b4a4a4f0e67fd0260e9447’)
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