More than six years have passed since the banking Trojan Emotet was first detected. During this time it has persistently mutated, varied direction, acquired partners, are caught up modules, and generally been the cause of high-profile incidents and multimillion-dollar losses. The malware is still in fine fettle, and remains one of the most potent cybersecurity threats out there. The Trojan is distributed through spam, which it sends itself, and can spread over local area network and download other malware.

All its “accomplishments” have been described thoroughly in various publications and reports from companies and independent researchers. This thing is the lawsuit, we decided to summarize and accumulate in one place everything that is currently known about Emotet.

2014 June

Emotet was first discovered in late June 2014 by TrendMicro. The malware hijacked customer banking credentials using the man-in-the-browser technique. Even in those early days, the malware was multicomponent: browser traffic was intercepted by a separate module downloaded from the C& C server. Its configuration file with web injections was also loaded from there. The banker’s main targets were patrons of German and Austrian banks, and its main distribution vector was spam disguised as bank emails with malicious attachments or links to a ZIP archive containing an executable file.

Examples of malicious emails with connect and attachment


In the fall of 2014, we discovered a modification of Emotet with the following components 😛 TAGEND

Module for modifying HTTP( S) traffic Module for collecting email addresses in Outlook Module for stealing accounts in Mail PassView( a password recuperation tool) Spam module( downloaded additionally as an independent executable file from addresses not is in relation to C& C) Module for organizing DDoS attempts

We came across the latter bundled with other malware, and assume that it was added to Emotet with a cryptor( presumably back then Emotet’s authors did not have their own and so applied a third-party one, possibly hacked or stolen ). It is entirely possible that the developers were unaware of its presence in their malware. In any case, this module’s C& C middles “re not” responsive, and it itself “re no longer” updated( compilation date: October 19, 2014 ).

In addition, the new modification had begun to employ techniques to steal monies from victims’ bank account automatically, employing the so-called Automatic Transfer System( ATS ). You can read more about this modification in our report.


The C& C servers stopped responding and the Trojan’s activity plummeted off significantly.

2015 January

In early 2015, a new Emotet modification was liberated , not all that different from the previous one. Among the changes were: new built-in public RSA key, most strings encrypted, ATS scripts for web injection cleared of statements, targets included patrons of Swiss banks.


The C& C servers again became unavailable, this time for 18 months. Judging by the configuration file with web injects, the Trojan’s most recent victims were patrons of Austrian, German and Polish banks.

2016 December

Emotet redux: for the first time in a long while, a new modification was discovered. This version infected web-surfing victims using the RIG-E and RIG-V exploit kits. This distribution method was not previously used by the Trojan, and, fast-forwarding ahead, would not be employed again. We believe that this was a trial attempt at a new distribution mechanism, which did not pass muster with Emotet’s authors.

The C& C communication protocol in this modification was also changed: for amounts of data less than 4 KB, a GET request was used, and the data itself was transmitted in the Cookie field of the HTTP header. For larger quantities, a POST request was used. The RC4 encryption algorithm had been replaced by AES, with the protocol itself based on a slightly modified Google Protocol Buffer. In response to the request, the C& C servers returned a header with a 404 Not Found error, which did not prevent them from transmitting the encrypted payload in the body of the reply.

Examples of GET and POST requests used by Emotet

The set of modules sent to the Trojan from C& C was different too 😛 TAGEND

Out was the module for intercepting and modifying HTTP( S) traffic In was a module for harvesting reports and passwords from browsers( WebBrowserPassView)

2017 February

Up until now, we had no confirmation that Emotet could mail spam independently. A couple of months after the C& C servers kicked back into life, we got proof when a spam module was downloaded from there.


In early April, a large amount of spam was assured targeting customers in Poland. Emails sent in the name of logistics corporation DHL asked recipients to download and open a “report” file in JavaScript format. Interestingly, the attackers did not try the further trick of disguising the executable JavaScript as a PDF. The figuring seemed to be that many users would simply not know that JavaScript is not at all a document or report file format.

Example of JS file names applied:

dhl__numer__zlecenia___4 7877695 89 _____kwi___1 2___2017. js( MD5: 7360d52b67d9fbb41458b3bd21c7f4de)

In April, a similar onslaught involving sham invoices targeted British-German users.

invoice__9 24 __apr___2 4___2017___lang___gb___gb924. js( MD5: e9 1c6653ca434c55d6ebf313a20f12b1) telekom_2017_04rechnung_60030039794.js( MD5: bcecf0 36 e318d7d844448e4359928b56)

Then in late April, the tactics varied slightly when the spam emails were supplemented with a PDF attachment which, when opened, informed the user that the report in JavaScript format was available for download via the devoted link.

Document_1 1861097 _NI_NSO___1 1861097. pdf( MD5: 2735A006F816F4582DACAA4090538F40)

Example of PDF record contents

Document_4 3571963 _NI_NSO___4 3571963. pdf( MD5: 42d6d07c757cf42c0b180831ef5989cb)

Example of PDF document contents

As for the JavaScript file itself, it was a typical Trojan-Downloader that downloaded and ran Emotet. Having successfully infected information systems, the script depicted the user a pretty mistake window.

Error message displayed by the malicious JavaScript file


In May, the strategy for distributing Emotet via spam altered slightly. This time, the attachment contained an Office document( or link to it) with an image disguised as an MS Word message saying something about the version of the above-mentioned documents being outdated. To open the document, the user was prompted to enable macros. If the victim did so, a malicious macro was executed that launched a PowerShell script that downloaded and ran Emotet.

Screenshot of the opened malicious document ab-5 8829278. dokument.doc( MD5: 21542133A586782E7C2FA4286D98FD73)

Also in May, it was reported that Emotet was downloading and installing the banking Trojan Qbot( or QakBot ). However, we cannot confirm this information: among the more than 1.2 million users attacked by Emotet, Qbot was detected in only a few dozen cases.


Starting June 1, a tool for spreading malicious code over a local area network( Network Spreader ), which would later become one of the malware modules, began being distributed from Emotet C& C servers. The malicious app comprised a self-extracting RAR archive containing the files bypass.exe( MD5: 341ce9aaf77030db9a1a5cc8d0382ee1) and service.exe( MD5: ffb1f 5c3455b471e870328fd399ae6b8 ).

Self-extracting RAR archive with bypass.exe and service.exe

bypass.exe 😛 TAGEND

Searches network resources by brute-forcing passwords using a built-in dictionary Copies service.exe to a suitable resource Creates a service on the remote system to autorun service.exe

Screenshot of the part for creating the service( bypass.exe)

Screenshot with a list of brute-force passwords( bypass.exe)

In words of functionality, service.exe is extremely limited and simply sends the name of the computer to the cybercriminals’ server.

Function for making data to be sent to C& C

Function for sending data to C& C

The mailing was obviously a test version, and the very next day we saw an update of the file. The self-extracting archive had been furnished with a script for autorunning bypass.exe( MD5: 5d75bbc6109dddba0c3989d25e41851f ), which had not undergone changes, while service.exe( MD5: acc9ba 224136 fc129a3622d2143f10fb) had grown in sizing by several dozen times.

Self-extracting RAR archive with bypass.exe and service.exe

The updated service.exe was larger because its body now contained a facsimile of Emotet. A part was added to save Emotet to disk and run it before sending data about the infected machine to C& C.

New parts in service.exe for saving Emotet to disk and running it


An update to the Emotet load module was distributed over the botnet. One notable modify: Emotet had fallen GET requests with data transfer in the Cookie field of the HTTP header. Henceforth, all C& C communication utilized POST( MD5: 643e1f4c5cbaeebc003faee56152f9cb ).


Network Spreader is included in the Emotet” distribution kit” as a DLL( MD5: 9c5c9c4f019c330aadcefbb781caac41 ), the compilation date of the new module is July 24, 2017, but it was obtained only in August. Recall that it used to be a self-extracting RAR archive with two files: bypass.exe and service.exe. The distribution mechanism did not change much, but the listing of brute-force passwords was expanded significantly to exactly 1,000.

Screenshot of the decrypted password list


In November 2017, IBM X-Force published a report about the new IcedId banker. According to the researchers, Emotet had been observed spreading it. We get our hands on the first IcedId sample( MD5: 7e8516db16b18f26e504285afe4f0b21) in April, and detected back then that it was wrapped in a cryptor also used in Emotet. The cryptor was not just similar, but a near byte-for-byte copy of the one in the Emotet sample( MD5: 2cd1ef13ee67f102cb99b258a61eeb20 ), which was being distributed at the same time.

2018 January

Emotet started distributing the banking Trojan Panda( Zeus Panda, first discovered in 2016 and based on the leaked Zbot banker source code, carries out man-in-the-browser attempts and intercepts keystrokes and input form content on websites ).

April April 9

In early April, Emotet acquired a module for distribution over wireless networks( MD5: 75d65cea0a33d11a2a74c703dbd2ad99 ), which tried to access Wi-Fi employing a dictionary strike. Its code resembled that of the Network Spreader module( bypass.exe ), which had been supplemented with Wi-Fi connection capability. If the brute-force was successful, the module transmitted data about the network to C& C.

Like bypass.exe, the module was distributed as a separate file( a.exe) inside a self-extracting archive( MD5: 5afdcffca43f8e7f848ba154ecf12539 ). The archive likewise contained the above-described service.exe( MD5: 5d6ff5cc8a429b17b5b5dfbf230b2ca4 ), which, like its first version, could do nothing except send the name of the infected computer to C& C.

Self-extracting RAR archive with a component for distribution over Wi-Fi

The cybercriminals quickly updated the module, and within a few hours of seeing the first version we received an updated self-extracting archive( MD5: d7c 5bf24904fc73b0481f6c7cde76e2a) containing a new service.exe with Emotet inside( MD5: 26d21612b676d66b93c51c611fa46773 ).

Self-extracting RAR archive with updated service.exe

The module was first publicly described only in January 2020, by Binary Defense. The return to the age-old distribution mechanism and the use of code from age-old modules looked a little strange, since back in 2017 bypass.exe and service.exe had been consolidated into one DLL module.

April 14

Emotet again started utilizing GET requests with data transfer in the Cookie field of the HTTP header for data transfer sizes of less than 1 KB simultaneously with POST requests for larger sums of data.( MD5: 38991b639b2407cbfa2e7c64bb4063c4 ). Also different was the template for fill the Cookie field. If earlier it took the sort Cookie:% X =, now it was Cookie:% u =. The newly added space between the numbers and the equals sign helped to identify Emotet traffic.

Example of a GET request

April 30

The C& C servers suspended specific activities and resumed it simply on May 16, after which the space in the GET request had gone.

Example of a corrected GET request


Yet another banking Trojan started applying Emotet to propagate itself. This time it was Trickster( or Trickbot) — a modular banker known since 2016 and the successor to the Dyreza banker.


The so-called UPnP module( MD5: 0f1d4dd066c0277f82f74145a7d2c48e ), based on the libminiupnpc bundle, was obtained for the first time. The module enabled port forwarding on the router of the requirements of a host in the local area network. This allowed the attackers not only to gain access to local network computers located behind NAT, but to turn an infected machine into a C& C proxy.


In August, there seemed reports of infections by the new Ryuk ransomware — a modification of the Hermes ransomware known since 2017. It later transpired that the chain of infection began with Emotet, which downloaded Trickster, which in turn installed Ryuk. Both Emotet and Trickster by this time had been armed with roles for distribution over a local area network, plus Trickster exploited known vulnerabilities in SMB, which further facilitated the dissemination of the malware across the local network. Coupled with Ryuk, it induced for a murderer combination.

At the end of the month, the listing of passwords in the Network Spreader module was updated. They still numbered 1,000, but about 100 had been changed( MD5: 3f82c2a733698f501850fdf4f7c00eb7 ).

Screenshot of the decrypted password list

October October 12

The C& C servers suspended their activity while we registered no distribution of new modules or updates. Activity resumed only on October 26.

October 30

The data exfiltration module for Outlook( MD5: 64C78044D2F6299873881F8B08D40995) was updated. The key innovation was the ability to steal the contents of the message itself. All the same, the amount of stealable data was limited to 16 KB( larger messages were truncated ).

Comparison of the code of the age-old and new versions of the data exfiltration module for Outlook


The C& C servers suspended their activity while we registered no distribution of new modules or updates. Activity resumed simply on December 6.


More downtime while C& C activity resumed simply on January 10, 2019.

2019 March March 14

Emotet again modified an integrated part of the HTTP protocol, switching to POST requests and using a dictionary to create the route. The Referer field was now filled, and Content-Type: multipart/ form-data seemed.( MD5: beaf5e 523 e8e3e3fb9dc2a361cda0573)

Code of the POST request generation function

Example of a POST request

March 20

Yet another change in the HTTP part of the protocol. Emotet dropped Content-Type: multipart/ form-data. The data itself was encoded applying Base6 4 and UrlEncode( MD5: 98fe402ef2b8aa2ca29c4ed133bbfe90 ).

Code of the updated POST request generation function

Example of a POST request


The first reports is a fact that datum stolen by the new data exfiltration module for Outlook was being used in Emotet spam mails: the use of theft topics, mailing lists and message contents was observed in emails.


The C& C servers stopped working for quite some time( 3 month ). Activity resumed merely on August 21, 2019. Over the following few weeks, nonetheless, the servers simply distributed updates and modules with no spam activity being observed. The time was likely spent restore communication with infected systems, collecting and processing data, and spreading over local networks.


A minor change to the HTTP part of the protocol. Emotet dropped the use of a dictionary to create the path, opting for a haphazardly produced string( MD5: dd3 3b9e4f928974c72539cd784ce9d20 ).

Example of a POST request

February February 6

Yet another change in the HTTP part of the protocol. The path now consisted not of a single string, but of several haphazardly produced words. Content-Type again became multipart/ form-data.

Example of a POST request

Along with the HTTP part, the binary component was also updated. The encryption remained the same, but Emotet dropped Google Protocol Buffer and switched to its own format. The compressing algorithm likewise modified, with zlib replaced by liblzf. More detailed information about the new protocol were available in the Threat Intel and CERT Polska reports.

February 7

C& C activity started to decline and resumed merely in July 2020. Over this period, the amount of spam fell to zero. At the same time, Binary Defense, in conjunction with various CERTs and the infosec community, began to distribute EmoCrash, a PowerShell script that creates incorrect values for system registry keys used by Emotet. This caused the malware to ” accident ” during installation. This killswitch operated until August 6, when the actors behind Emotet patched the vulnerability.


Only a few periods after the resumption of spam activity, online reports appeared that someone was replacing the malicious Emotet payload on compromised websites with images and memes. As a outcome, clicking the links in spam emails opened an ordinary image instead of a malicious document. This did not last long, and by July 28 the malicious files had stopped being replaced with images.


Despite its ripe old age, Emotet is constantly evolving and remains one of the most current menaces out there. Save for the explosive growth in distribution after five months of inactivity, we have yet to see anything previously unobserved; that said, a detailed analysis always takes time, and we will publish the results of the study in due course. On top of that, we are currently observing the evolution of third-party malware that propagates employing Emotet, which we will certainly cover in future reports.

Our security answers can block Emotet at any stage of strike. The mail filter blocks spam, the heuristic component sees malicious macros and removes them from Office documents, while the behavioral analysis module constructs our protection system resistant not only to statistical analysis bypass techniques, but to new modifications of program behavior as well.

To mitigate the health risks, it is vital to receive accurate, reliable, before-the-fact information about all information security matters. Scanning IP addresses, file hashes and domains/ URLs on opentip can determine if an object poses a genuine threat based on risk degrees and additional contextual information. Analyzing files with opentip, applying our proprietary technologies, including dynamic, statistical and behavioral analysis, as well as our world reputation system, can help detect advanced mass and latent threats.

And Kaspersky Threat Intelligence is there to track constantly evolving cyberthreats, analyze them, respond to assaults in good time, and minimize the consequences.

IOC Most active C& Cs in November 2020:

173. 212.214.235: 7080 167. 114.153.111 :8 080 67. 170.250.203: 443 121. 124.124.40: 7080 103. 86.49.11 :8 080 172. 91.208.86 :8 0 190. 164.104.62 :8 0 201. 241.127.190 :8 0 66. 76.12.94 :8 080 190. 108.228.27: 443

Links to Emotet extracted from malicious records

hxxp :// tudorinvest [.] com/ wp-admin/ rGtnUb5f/ hxxp://dp-womenbasket[.]com/wp-admin/Li/ hxxp :// stylefix [.] co/ guillotine-cross/ CTRNOQ/ hxxp://[.]br/simulador/bPNx/ hxxps :// sangbadjamin [.] com/ move/ r/ hxxps://asimglobaltraders[.]com/baby-rottweiler/duDm64O/ hxxp :// sell.smartcrowd [.] ae/ wp-admin/ CLs6YFp/ hxxps://chromadiverse[.]com/wp-content/OzOlf/ hxxp :// rout6 6motors [.] com/ wp-admin/ goi7o 8/ hxxp://caspertour.asc-florida[.]com/wp-content/gwZbk/

MD5s of malicious Office documents downloading Emotet

59d7ae5463d9d2e1d9e77c94a435a786 7ef93883eac9bf82574ff2a75d04a585 4b393783be7816e76d6ca4b4d8eaa14a

MD5s of Emotet executable files

4c3b6e5b52268bb463e8ebc602593d9e 0ca86e8da55f4176b3ad6692c9949ba4 8d4639aa32f78947ecfb228e1788c02b 28df8461cec000e86c357fdd874b717e 82228264794a033c2e2fc71540cb1a5d 8fc87187ad08d50221abc4c05d7d0258 b3 0dd0b88c0d10cd96913a7fb9cd05ed c3 7c5b64b30f2ddae58b262f2fac87cb 3afb20b335521c871179b230f9a0a1eb 92816647c1d61c75ec3dcd82fecc08b2

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