As Microsoft alongside our industry partners and the security community continues to investigate the extent of the Solorigate attack, our goal is to provide the latest threat intelligence including IOCs and guidance across our products and solutions to help the community fight back against, harden your infrastructure, and begin to recover from this attack of unprecedented scale. As new information becomes available, we will make updates to this article.

This blog will outline lessons learned from this and other incident response to date in on-premises and cloud environments. This latest guidance is for customers looking to re-establish trusted identities for credentials that are suspected of compromise by Solorigate malware.

This article is intended to give experienced incident responders some the recommendations on techniques to consider when helping an organization respond to a suspected systemic identity compromise, like we’re seeing in some victims of the Solorigate malware, based on our experience in the field in similar scenarios. Re-establishing trust in the organization’s on-premises and cloud environments with minimal business impact necessitates in-depth investigation and an understanding of potential methods of persistence. While not meant to cover every possible scenario, this guidance is intended to summarize our experience with similar customer transgress and will be updated if we been informed of new information that would help with successful recuperation. Please review the resources referenced at the end of this article for additional information. This information is provided as-is and constitutes generalized counseling; the ultimate finding about how to apply this guidance to your IT environment and tenant( s) must consider your unique environment and needs, which each Customer is in the best position to determine.

The Solorigate investigation referenced in this guidance is ongoing at the time of book and our teams continue to act as first responders to these attacks. As new information becomes available, we will make updates through our Microsoft Security Response Center( MSRC) blog.

Overview of the intrusion

As described in this Microsoft blog post, the hallmarks of this actor’s activity include, but are not limited to, the following techniques that are likely to result in systemic identity compromise 😛 TAGEND

An intrusion through malicious code in the SolarWinds Orion product. This results in the attacker gaining a foothold in the network, which the attacker can use to gain elevated credentials. Microsoft Defender now has detections for these files. Read our in-depth technical analysis of the Solorigate malware. An intruder applying administrative permissions( acquired through an on-premises compromise) to gain access to an organization’s trusted SAML token-signing certificate. This enables them to forge SAML tokens to impersonate any of the organization’s existing customers and reports, including highly privileged reports. Anomalous logins use the SAML tokens signed with a compromised token-signing certificate, which can be used against any on-premises resources( regardless of identity system or vendor) as well as against any cloud environment( regardless of vendor) because they have been configured to trust digital certificates. An organisation may miss the use of illegitimate SAML tokens because they are signed with a legitimate certificate. The employ of highly privileged accounts( acquired through the technique above or other means) to add illegitimate credentials to existing application service principals, enabling the attacker to call APIs with the permission assigned to that application.

Overview of response objectives

Organizations that have experienced systemic identity compromise need to start recovery by re-establishing trustworthy communications. This is an opportunity for effective triage and coordination of business operations recovery.

Many organizations have complex internal and external interdependencies. Core business processes and applications in an organization are likely to be temporarily impacted during recovery efforts until trust within your environment is re-established. Microsoft recommends that Incident Responders establish secure communications with key organizational personnel as the first step towards organizational recuperation. If your investigation indicates that the attacker has used techniques outside of identity compromise at lower levels of your organizations’ infrastructure, such as hardware or firmware attacks, you will need to address those threats to reduce the risk of re-compromise.

Response the goals and objectives of approximate order 😛 TAGEND

Establish procure communications for personnel key to the investigation and response attempt. Investigate the environment for perseverance and initial access phase, while establishing continuous monitoring procedures during recovery efforts. Regain and retain administrative control of your environment and remediate or block possible persistence techniques and initial access exploits. Improve posture by enabling security features and capabilities following best practice recommendations.

We recommend that incident responders review and digest the totality of the present guidelines before taking action, as the specific order of actions taken to achieve the response objectives is very situational and depends heavily on the results( and completeness) of investigation and the business constraints of the specific organization. The following sections describe the incident Response techniques we recommend you consider for each of the above objectives.

Establish secure communications and productivity

Successful response involves being able to communicate without the attacker eavesdropping on your communications. Until you have achieved assurance in the privacy of your communications on your current infrastructure, use altogether isolated identities and communication resources to coordinate your response and discuss topics that could potentially tip off the attacker to your investigation. Until your investigation has achieved assurance in actor ouster, we strongly recommend that you retain all incident-related comms isolated to enable you to have the element of astonish when taking remediation actions.

Initial one-on-one and group communications can be achieved through phone( PSTN) yell, conference bridges not is attached to the corporate infrastructure, and end-to-end encrypted messaging solutions. One style that many clients have established fasten productivity and collaboration is to create a new Office 365 renter which is completely isolated from the organization’s production tenant and create accounts only for the key personnel needed, and any incident response vendors or collaborators who need to be part of the response.

Make sure to follow best practices for securing this tenant, especially administrative reports and rights by default. The new tenant should be limited on Administrative rights together with no trusts with outside applications or dealers. If you need further assistance or want information on hardening Microsoft 365, you can review the guidance here.

Investigate your environment

Once your incident responders and key personnel have a secure place to collaborate, the next step is to investigate the suspected compromised environment. Successful investigation will be a balance between getting to the bottom of every anomalous behaviour to fully scope the extent of attacker activity and persistence and taken any steps rapidly to stop any further activity on objectives by the attacker. Successful remediation requires as complete an understanding of the initial technique of entry and persistence mechanisms controlled by the attacker as possible. Any persistence mechanisms missed could result in continued access by the attacker and potential for re-compromise.

Investigate and examine cloud environment logs for suspicious activities and attacker IOCs, including:

Unified Audit Logs( UAL ). Azure Active Directory( Azure AD) logs. Active Directory logs. Exchange on-prem logs. VPN logs. Engineering systems logging. Antivirus and endpoint detection logging.

Review endpoint audit logs for modifies from on-premises for actions including, but not to restrict, the following:

Group membership modifications. New consumer account creation. Delegations within Active Directory. Along with other typical signs of compromise or activity.

Review Administrative rights in your environments

Review privileged access in the cloud and remove any unnecessary permissions. Implement Privileged Identity Management( PIM ); setup Conditional Access policies to limit administrative access during hardening. Evaluation privileged access on-premise and remove unnecessary permissions. Reduce membership of built-in groups, substantiate Active Directory delegations, harden Tier 0 environment, and limit who has access to Tier 0 assets. Evaluation all Enterprise Applications for delegated permissions and consent awards that allow( sample script to assist ):

Modification of privileged consumers and roles. Reading or retrieving all mailboxes. Send or forwarding email on behalf of the members of other customers. Accessing all OneDrive or SharePoint sites content. Adding service principals that can read/ write to the Directory.

Review access and configuration settings for the following Office 365 products:

SharePoint Online Sharing Teams PowerApps OneDrive for Business

Review user reports

Review and remove guest customers that are no longer needed. Review email configurations using Hawk or something similar.

Delegates Mailbox folder permissions ActiveSync mobile device registrations Inbox Rules Outlook on the Web Option

Validate that both MFA and self-service password reset( SSPR) contact information for all users is correct.

You may find that one or more of the logging sources above are data sources that the organization does not currently include in its security program. Some of them, especially the logging offered in the cloud, are available only if configured and we recommend that you configure them as soon as possible to enable both the detections in the following section and forensics review of logs going forward. Make sure to configure your log retention to support your organization’s investigation purposes going forward and retain evidence, if needed for legal, regulatory, or insurance purposes.

Establish continuous monitoring

There are many ways to detect activity associated with this campaign. Exactly how your organization will see attacker behavior depends on which security tools you have available, or choose to deploy in response. Microsoft has provided examples publicly for some of the core security products and services that we give and are continually updating those documents as new threat intelligence is identified related to this attacker. If you use other vendor’s products, review your vendor’s recommendations, and review the Microsoft documentation below to understand the detecting techniques if you need to implement analogous detectings in your environment on your own.

For readers utilizing Azure Sentinel in their environments, examine SolarWinds Post-Compromise Hunting guidance.

For readers utilizing Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, review our guidance here, and review Microsoft Defender Antivirus guidance.

Azure Active Directory sign-ins

You can view this information from the Azure Active Directory Sign-in blade by selecting an appropriate day window and then downloading the report as either a CSV or JSON file. NOTE: You can download interactive, as well as non-interactive, sign-in reports via this interface. “Once youve” downloaded the results, look for the value “MFA requirement satisfied by claim in the token” in the “MFA result” field.

You can also use the Get-AzureADAuditSignInLogs cmdlet( see the details here) and filter the results to simply return enters that match this field value, as seen in this example 😛 TAGEND Get-AzureADAuditSignInLogs -All :$ true-life -Filter “createdDateTime gt and createdDateTime lt ” | where $ _.Status.AdditionalDetails -eq “MFA requirement satisfied by claim in the token” | select-object CreatedDateTime, IpAddress, UserAgent, ResourceDisplayName, CorrelationId, RequestId, UserPrincipalName -ExpandProperty Status

If your ADFS environment is configured to send a claim for MFA being satisfied, this may not be a strong signal. However, for many organizations utilizing ADFS, and this claim is not included per your configuration; in those cases, the presence of this claim may be a strong indicator of attacker activity. You may also wish to add additional filters or conditions in the where clause to further improve your signal to noise ratio, such as only surfacing results from realms that are federated.

If suspicious sign-ins are seen, you are eligible to further pivot your investigation based on IP addresses identified, user accounts identified, and/ or other indicators such as the UserAgent string and client operating system observed, if based on your knowledge of your environment these appear to be strong indicators.

Analysis of risky sign-in events

In some lawsuits, Azure Active Directory and its Identity Protection platform will generate risk events associated with the use of attacker made SAML tokens. These is likely to be labeled as “unfamiliar properties”, “anonymous IP address”, “impossible travel” and the other risk events as described here.

Closely analyze all peril events associated with reports that have administrative privileges. It is also important to analyze events that have been rejected or remediated as some of these actions are done automatically. For instance, a risk event for an anonymous IP address can be automatically remediated because the user passed MFA.

Detecting of domain authentication properties

The attacker may attempt to manipulate the domain authentication policies which are recorded in the Azure Active Directory Audit Logs and is illustrated in the Unified Audit Log. An attacker who has gained access with Global Administrator privileges can modify the domains that are federated and/ or trusted. Review any events associated with “Set domain authentication” in either the Unified Audit Log, Azure AD Audit Logs, and/ or your SIEM environment. Verify that all activities were expected and planned.

The sample command below returns the enters from the Unified Audit Log which were associated with manipulation of domain authentication settings.

Search-UnifiedAuditLog -StartDate < startdate > -EndDate < enddate > -ResultSize 5000 -Operations “Set domain authentication” Detection of credentials to a service principal associated with an OAuth application

If the attacker has gained control of a credential with sufficient privileges, the attack pattern includes situating an application that has been granted the ability to access any user’s e-mail in “the organizations activities” and adding attacker controlled credentials to that application. In some occurrences, the attacker has modified these applications awarding them additional rights including access to all e-mail in the organization.

The following are procedures that would be consistent with attacker behaviour 😛 TAGEND

Add service principal credentials. Update application- certificates and secrets management. Update service principal. Add app role assignment to service principal. Add app role assignment grant to user. Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.

Detection e-mail access by applications

Detection of access to e-mail by applications can be achieved utilizing the Advanced Auditing capabilities of Office 365. Access to messages inside of Office 365 is audited via the MailItemsAccessed capability.

Analyze events in the Unified Audit Log for the Operation of MailItemsAccessed.

Detecting of non-interactive sign-ins to service principals

Azure Active Directory in the Sign-In reports offer reporting of non-interactive sign-ins employing credentials issued to service principals( as was observed in this attack ). Analyzing the sign-ins for service principals reports can provide valuable data such as the IP Address the attacker was using to access the applications for e-mail access.

If there is evidence found that uncovers administrative permissions acquired through the on-premises compromise to gain access to your organization’s global administrator account and/ or trusted SAML token signing certification, Microsoft recommends taking the following immediate actions 😛 TAGEND Remediate and retain administrative control Regaining and retaining administrative control of your environment

If your investigation has identified that the attacker has administrative control in the organization’s cloud environment and/ or on-prem, it’s critical to regain control in such a way as to ensure that the attacker isn’t persistent. Exactly which steps you will take depend both on what perseverance you was found in your investigation, and your level of confidence in the completeness of that investigation and discovery of all possible the methods used in entry and persistence. While it is possible to regain control with high confidence, even in the face of an incomplete investigation, doing so requires significant impact to business operations, so most organisations choose to remediate based on the results of the investigation in our experience.

We recommend you consider the following steps when building your administrative control recovery plan, but the exact order and timing should be planned based on the results of your investigation and understanding of adversary owned administrative assets and methods of persistence.

Ensure that any actions described here are performed from a trusted device constructed from a clean source, such as a privileged access workstation. If the organization has lost control of its token signing credentials or federated trust the highest assurance approach is to remove trust and switch to cloud mastered identity while remediating on-prem. A detailed plan for doing so is beyond the scope of this document and requires careful planning and understanding of the business operations impacts of isolating identity. Review the Azure Active Directory counseling or key considerations. Should your organization choose not to break trust while recovering administrative control on-prem, you’ll need to rotate your SAML token signing certificate once you have regained administrative control on-prem and blocked the attacker’s ability to access the signing certificate again. It’s critical that your organization follow the certificate rotation instructions below to ensure that the attacker doesn’t maintain the ability to forge tokens for your realm.

Rotation of ADFS token ratify certification

For a compromised or potentially compromised ADFS Token Signing certificate, rotating the Token Signing certificate a single time would still let the previous Token Signing certificate to work. The rationale for this is to permit a grace interval to update your Relying Party Trusts prior to expiration of the certificate during normal rotation of the signing certificate.

If instead of rolling the Token Signing Certificate your organization feels the need to replace the ADFS servers with known clean systems, you can follow steps to remove the existing ADFS from your environment and build a new one.

Delete Azure AD Cloud Provisioning agent configuration .

Should your organization decide to rotate the certificate on your current ADFS servers, follow these steps in the below order, from the ADFS server 😛 TAGEND

Check to make sure that your AutoCertificateRollover is set to True. Get-AdfsProperties | FL AutoCert *, Certificate*

If it is not, you can determined it with this command: Set-ADFSProperties -AutoCertificateRollover$ true-life

Connect to the Microsoft Online Service Connect-MsolService Document both your on-premise and cloud Token Signing Certificate thumbprint and expiration dates. Get-MsolFederationProperty -DomainName

Replace the primary Token Signing certificate apply the -Urgent switch to cause ADFS to supplant the primary certification immediately without constructing it a Secondary certificate. Update-AdfsCertificate -CertificateType Token-Signing -Urgent

Create a secondary Token Signing certificate without employing the -Urgent switch to allow for two on-premise Token Signing certificates, before syncing with Azure cloud. Update-AdfsCertificate -CertificateType Token-Signing

Update the cloud environment with both the primary and secondary credentials on-premise to immediately remove the cloud published token signing credential. If this pace is not completed applying this method you leave the potential for the old token signing certificate to still authenticate customers. Update-MsolFederatedDomain -DomainName

Verification that you completed the above steps and removed the certificate that was displayed in Step 3 above. Get-MsolFederationProperty -DomainName

Revoke freshen tokens via PowerShell, datum can be found here and you can also reference how to “Revoke user access in Azure Active Directory.”

Note: This will log customers out of their telephone, current webmail sessions, together with other items that are using Tokens and Refresh Tokens.

Additional cloud remediation activities to complete

Reset passwords on any break-glass reports and reduce the number of break-glass reports to the absolute minimum required. We recommend that service and user reports with Privileged access should be Cloud Only accounts and not use on-premise accounts synced or federated to Azure Active Directory. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication( MFA) across all elevated customers in the tenant. We recommend enforcing MFA across all users in the tenant. Implement Privileged Identity Management( PIM) and conditional access to limit administrative access.

For Office 365 consumers, implement Privileged Access Management( PAM ) to limit access to sensitive capabilities( including eDiscovery, Global Admin, Account Administration, and more ).

Review and reduce all Enterprise Applications delegated permissions or consent awards that allow such as:

Modification of privileged customers and roles. Reading, sending email, or accessing all mailboxes. Accessing OneDrive, Teams, or SharePoint content. Adding of Service Principal that can read/ write to the Directory. Application Permissions versus Delegated Access.

Additional on-premises remediation activities to complete

Rebuild systems that were identified as compromised by the attacker during your investigation. Remove unnecessary members from Domain Admins, Backup Operators, and Enterprise Admin groups. Reference Microsoft’s Securing Privileged Access. Reset passwords of all privileged reports in the environment.

Privilege reports are not limited to Built-In groups but can also be groups that are delegated access to Server Administration/ Workstation Administration and other aspects of your environment.

Reset the krbtgt report using this script twice.

Note: If you are using Read-Only Domain Controllers, you will need to run the script for Read-Write Domain Controllers and Read-Only Domain Controllers.

After you validate that no persistence mechanisms created by the attacker exist or are still on your system, schedule a restart. This can assist with removing memory resident malware. Reset each domain controller’s DSRM( Directory Services Restore Mode) password to something unique and complex.

Remediate or block persistence discovered during investigation

Remediate the persistence techniques identified in your investigation stage earlier. Investigation is an iterative process and you’ll need to balance the organizational desire to remediate as you identify anomalies and the possibility that remediation will alert the attacker of your detecting and cause them to react by changing techniques or creating additional persistence. For Office 365 accounts, automatically remediate known persistence techniques, if any are discovered, applying the scripts described

Remediate consumer and service account access

Some of the user-level acts we recommend were described above already, specifically in terms of ensuring that MFA is enabled and running specific remediation scripts to clean up known persistence techniques. Here are some additional steps you should consider taking to remediate and restore user accounts 😛 TAGEND

Enforce conditional access based on trusted device.

If possible, enforce location-based conditional access that suits your organizational requirements.

For any customer reports suspected of being compromised, immediately reset passwords after eviction; make sure you also implement a mid-term plan to reset credentials for all reports in your directory. After credential rotation, use PowerShell to cancel refresh tokens immediately. More datum can be found here and additional resources can be found at Revoke user access in emergency measures in Azure Active Directory | Microsoft Docs.

Improve security posture

After a security event is a good time for organizations to reflect on their security strategy and priorities. Incident Responders are often asked to provide recommendations after an event on what investments “the organizations activities” should prioritize now that it’s been faced with new threats. In addition to the recommendations documented earlier, we recommend you consider these areas of focus for your post-incident review recommendations that are responsive to the post-exploitation techniques used by this attacker and the common security posture gaps that enable them.

General security posture

Review Microsoft Secure Score for security fundamentals recommendations customized for the Microsoft products and services you ingest. Ensure that your organization has EDR and SIEM solutions in place. Examine Microsoft’s Enterprise access model.

Identity

Review Five steps to securing your identity infrastructure and prioritize stairs as appropriate for your Identity architecture. Consider migrating to Azure AD Security Defaults for your authentication policy- details become available here. Eliminate your organization’s use of legacy authentication, if systems or applications still require it- review the guidance here.

As announced last year, the Exchange Team is planning to disable Basic Authentication for the EAS, EWS, POP, IMAP, and RPS protocols in the latter half of 2021. As a degree of clarity, Security Defaults and Authentication Policy are separate but render complementary features. We recommend that customers use Authentication Policies to turn off Basic Authentication for a subset of Exchange Online protocols or to gradually turn off Basic Authentication across a large organization. While more details will come in future proclamations, as mentioned in April, we plan to begin incapacitating Basic Authentication under existing tenants with no recorded usage as early as October 2020. We will provide notifications via Message Center posts before we disable Basic Authentication for any renter.

In order to help protect your ADFS/ Azure AD Connect systems, beyond the ADFS guidance situated, we recommend that you consider the following actions:

Treat your ADFS infrastructure and AD Connect infrastructure as a Tier 0 asset. Curtail local administrative access to the system, including the account that is used to run the ADFS service.

The least privilege necessary for the account operating ADFS is the Log on as a Service User Right Assignment.

Restrict administrative access to limited users and from limited IP address scopes by leveraging Windows Firewall policies for Remote Desktop.

It is recommended to set up a Tier 0 jump container or equivalent system.

Block all inbound SMB access to the systems from anywhere in the environment. See this resource for further details.

Get the Windows Firewall logs to a SIEM for historic and proactive monitoring.

If you are using a Service Account and your environment assistances it, migrate from a Service Account to a group Managed Service Account( gMSA ). If you cannot move to a gMSA, rotate the password on the Service Account to a complex password. Ensure Verbose logging is enabled on your ADFS systems by executing the following commands:

Set-AdfsProperties -AuditLevel verbose Restart-Service -Name adfssrv Auditpol.exe/ defined/ subcategory: ”Application Generated”/ failing: enable/ success: enable

Implement Sysmon in the environment use a configuration acquired here.

Contributors: We thank the team at FireEye for their contributions and review.

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